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I. from “zero to one”?  
tHe “ComplICated relatIonsHIp” Between law and teCHnology
Traditionally, all revolutions in history sooner or later had to come to terms 
with lawyers, and with the law in general:1 the English and American revolutions 
were based on law and the rule of  law, the French revolution run over existing 
law and rebuilt a new one, but certainly did not dispense with the lawyers, and 
even the Bolshevik revolution or Maoism established a new law alternative to the 
previous respective paradigms, but still felt the need to extensively use the law to 
pursue their goals. As for the revolutions understood not in the political sense, 
but in the technical-scientific one, at least in modern times, they have not led to 
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1 The link between law and revolutions has been the subject of  several studies: a classic reference is 
to HJ Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of  the Western Legal Tradition (CUP 1983); see also, 
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of  Legal History 125; Hendrik Hartog (ed), The Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in 
the Law: A Collection of  Review Essays on American Legal History (New York University 1981); Michael 
P Fitzsimmons, The Parisian Order of  Barristers and the French Revolution (Harvard University Press 
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the overcoming of  the law, if  anything to its transformation and adaptation: the 
industrial revolution certainly provoked considerable turmoil in the world of  law, 
but the fundamental structure remained unaltered, and the lawyers maintained 
their prestige intact even in the very changed circumstances, effect of  the scientific-
technological upheavals. Therefore, no previous revolution actually engaged in 
“killing all the lawyers”, not even metaphorically.2
Instead, the current digital revolution would seem to put the law and the 
role of  lawyers in serious crisis for the first time: as is well known, we would be 
faced with a scenario in which law and code are assimilated and confused,3 
for which a complete rethinking and updating of  the law would be necessary to 
keep up with the emerging disruptive technologies. In this context, even the role 
of  lawyers would have to be completely thought over: tight between legal tech, 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, smart contracts, and their replacement 
with machines,4 they would have no other choice but to reinvent themselves as 
computer scientists, relinquishing command of  their discipline to the relentless 
advance of  increasingly intelligent and powerful computers.
In other words, the typical feature of  innovation in the digital world and 
in the field of  new technologies, captured in the spot-on title of  a wonderful book 
by Peter Thiel, Zero to One,5 would have transferred to the law. That is to say that, 
contrary to what happened with previous revolutions, in this case even law should 
be, or perhaps already is subject to a break in continuity, or a complete break with 
2 As goes the famous line by the fictional character Dick the Butcher in William Shakespeare’s 
Henri VI (Part 2): during a discussion among rebels led by Jack Cade on what they should do once 
they take the throne, the following conversation takes place: “Cade. Be brave, then; for your captain 
is brave, and vows reformation. There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a penny: 
the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer: all the 
realm shall be in common, and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass. And, when I am king, – 
as king I will be, – All. God save your majesty! Cade. I thank you, good people: – there shall be no 
money; all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may 
agree like brothers, and worship me their lord. Dick. The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers. 
Cade Nay, That I mean to do. […] Cade I thank you, good people: you shall eat and drink of  my 
score, and go all in my livery; and we’ll have no writing but the score and the tally, and there shall 
be no laws but such as come from my mouth”.
3 The reference is to Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of  Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999); the 
dichotomy between law and code was picked up by many authors, including Primavera De Filippi 
and Aaaron Wright in Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of  Code (Harvard University Press 2018). 
4 See for instance N Sahota, “Will A.I. Put Lawyers Out of  Business?” Forbes (New Jersey 9 February 
2019) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/02/09/will-a-i-put-lawyers-out-of-
business> (accessed 25 October 2019).
5 Peter Thiel with Blake Masters, Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future (Crown Busi-
ness 2014).
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the past, which would lead to a completely new paradigm, where progressively all 
the law is reduced to binary logic.6
In this paper, I would like to question this approach: I do not want at all to 
support a position of  resistance to the new technologies, or yearn for a slowdown in 
the digital revolution, and in particular for the law to hinder the increasingly rapid 
innovation. This is in fact the position taken by some,7 but, quite to the opposite, I 
believe instead that innovation, however rapid, should not be hindered, but rather 
favoured as much as possible in terms of  public policy choices. Rather, I intend to 
focus on the question of  whether the emerging technologies, which are making the 
scientific and economic world make a leap indeed from “zero to one”, also actually 
require a law that is reborn from scratch, and the reinvention of  its foundations, in 
order to keep up with innovation.
It has been argued that the law must be endowed with new categories in 
order to accommodate the novelties that the technological evolution is producing 
at an unceasing and increasingly accelerated rate.8 I submit, however, that the 
law we have is perfectly equipped to regulate an economic and technological 
framework that is clearly evolving very rapidly: it is arguably not necessary to resort 
to new categories to keep up with this evolution, or, in any case, it would always 
be preferable to check with great caution whether the new legal problems that 
have arisen with the new technologies cannot be resolved in a completely adequate 
way with the legal categories of  the analogue world. Only if  this careful analysis 
is unsuccessful will the search for new categories be warranted, but this is by no 
means a foregone conclusion, it has to be proven, and the burden of  proof  lies with 
those who advocate the need to reinvent the law. 
In the following paragraphs, I will therefore argue that the one between 
law and technology can be a happy marriage, and not necessarily a divorce, where 
each party go their own way. To this end, however, in order for this “complicated 
relationship9” to work, as in any self-respecting marriage, some essential 
ingredients will be needed, which I will go on to analyse in the next paragraphs: 
something old (Section II), something new (Section III), something borrowed 
(Section IV), something blue (Section V). The final paragraph (Section VI) offers 
6 See the reflections by A Lo Giudice, “The Concept of  Law in Postnational Perspective”, in LH 
Urscheler and SP Donlan (eds), Concepts of  Law. Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science Perspec-
tives (Routledge 2016) 209.
7 See for instance Fritjof  Capra and Ugo Mattei, The Ecology of  Law: Toward a Legal System in Tune 
with Nature and Community (Berrett-Koehler 2015).
8 At least to a certain extent, it is the position taken for example by E Biber and others, “Regulating 
Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb” (2017) 70(5) Vanderbilt 
Law Review 1561.
9 As in one of  the possible options to select for “relationship status” on a previous Facebook version 
(“it’s complicated”). 
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my conclusive remarks. In my work, I will make ample reference to the works 
of  Bruno Leoni, an Italian philosopher of  law who put forward some extremely 
acute and profound reflections which, although written a few decades ago, are very 
useful to respond to the legal challenges posed by the emergence on the scene of  
the new technologies.
II. sometHIng old
As anticipated in the introductory paragraph, arguably the current rise of  
the digital technologies is only to a certain extent “the start of  something new”.10 
Let me make a few examples.
The sharing economy undoubtedly raises questions the legal notions of  
ownership and property:11 how adequate is the traditional property law to cope 
with the changing relationships between people and things? We no longer own 
many of  the goods we use, but we rent or lease them, or have them in other forms 
of  temporary detention (think of  cars, computers, smartphones),12 or however 
goods of  increasing economic importance see us as simply licensees, not owners 
(think of  software, cloud storage space and what this entails for our files, etc.).13
As a consequence, to use the traditional metaphor of  the ‘bundle of  sticks’,14 
less and less sticks are left to the ‘owner’, and more and more remain in the hands 
of  corporate powers and multinational conglomerates, who retain control over the 
goods they sell or lease or license.
To be sure, this is not in fact a completely new phenomenon, or in any case 
a phenomenon of  the “zero to one” type: the issue of  limited in time rights over 
things has been addressed by important authors for quite some time,15 and even 
before the digital revolution showed all the disruptive potential that it has shown 
more recently. Therefore, the shift from property to other forms of  relationship, 
10 This is just another reference to popular culture.
11 See for instance S Kreiczer-Levy, “Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy” (2016) 43 
Pepp L Rev 61.
12 See C Cain Miller, “Is Owning Overrated? The Rental Economy Rises” The New York Times (New 
York, 31 August 2014), p SR3 of  the New York edition.
13 According to Kroll’s Global Fraud & Risk Report. Forging New Paths in Times of  Uncertainty (10th annual 
edn 2017/18), p 10, in 2017: “For the first time in 10 years of  reporting, information theft, loss, or 
attack was the most prevalent type of  fraud experienced in the last year, cited by 29% of  respond-
ents, up 5 percentage points from 24% of  respondents in the 2016 survey. This in turn was up 7 
percentage points from 22% of  respondents in the 2015 survey. Theft of  physical assets or stock, 
long the most common type of  fraud, was the second most frequently cited incident, suffered by 
27% of  respondents”. 
14 On which see, for instance, DR Johnson, “Reflections on the Bundle of  Rights” (2007) 32 Vt L 
Rev 247.
15 E.g. R Caterina, I diritti sulle cose limitati nel tempo (Giuffrè 2000).
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typically contractual and temporary, with things, appears if  anything relevant in 
terms of  comparative increase in space for the latter type of  relationship compared 
to traditional property, but not something radically, intrinsically new.
Even considering one of  the innovative technologies on which the attention 
of  public opinion and specialists has increasingly been focusing, namely the 
distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) famously at the basis of  the blockchain, 
Bitcoin and smart contracts, the conclusion is arguably the same. Various legal 
systems, in particular those apparently more attentive to the evolution of  new 
technologies and more eager to direct this evolution towards desirable goals and 
within a precise legal framework, have introduced normative definitions of  these 
new phenomena,16 thus sanctioning, more or less consciously, the idea that they 
represent something irreducible to the old legal categories, that warrants the 
creation of  new ones.
In truth, this does not appear to be the preferable approach:17 the DLTs, the 
blockchain, the smart contracts can in fact be classified in the existing categories,18 
without the need to introduce new institutions whose relationship with the existing 
ones will inevitably be problematic and will take some time to be arranged in a 
satisfactory way, if  it can actually be arranged at all. Smart contracts are in fact 
pieces of  software, whose legal implications it is a very stimulating endeavour to 
investigate;19 but also the blockchain and Bitcoin can arguably be traced back to 
16 A comprehensive and updated account is for instance the one provided by Chetcuti Cauchi 
Advocates’ Blockchain, Crypto & ICOs. A Legal Review of  Leading Jurisdictions <https://blockchain.
chetcuticauchi.com/report/> (accessed 25 October 2019). For some reflections on the regulatory 
responses to the DLTs revolution, see R Herian, “Regulating Disruption: Blockchain, GDPR, and 
Questions of  Data Sovereignty” (2018) 22(2) Journal of  Internet Law 1, 1, 8–16.
17 For the opposite view, see for instance K Werbach, “Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs 
the Law” (2018) 33 Berkeley Tech LJ 487, and OY Marian, “Blockchain Havens and the Need 
for Their Internationally-Coordinated Regulation” (2019) 20 North Carolina Journal of  Law 
and Technology. Quite surprisingly, Eu institutions found no need to rush to regulate the crypto 
market: see Bloomberg, “Europe Is in No Rush to Regulate Crypto Market, Officials Say” Fortune 
(New York, 8 September 2018) <http://fortune.com/2018/09/08/europe-cryptocurrency-regula-
tion/> (accessed 25 October 2019).
18 See R de Caria, “The Legal Meaning of  Smart Contracts” (2018) 26(6) European Review of  
Private Law 731.
19 See R de Caria, “The Definition(s) of  Smart Contracts Between Law and Code” in M Cannarsa, 
LA Di Matteo and C Poncibò (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of  Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology 
and Digital Platforms (CUP 2019) 19.
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existing legal institutions, which may vary according to different legal systems,20 
but which in any case exist everywhere.
But the same holds true for all the main areas in which we see the 
proliferation of  technological innovation and the consequent rapid increase in 
legal questions that this entails: e-commerce does not change the key assumptions 
of  contract law, 3D printing is part of  a well-established framework of  intellectual 
property law, the same artificial intelligence, robotics and the Internet of  Things 
produce new scenarios and generate new problems, including legal ones, but they 
can be addressed satisfactorily with the statutory instruments of  contractual and 
non-contractual liability.
Ultimately, it is arguably necessary to recover the notion of  “evolutionary 
law” 21 adopted by a not yet enough appreciated academic tradition, among 
scholars of  both of  law and economics, ranging from Carl Menger to Murray 
Rothbard and especially Bruno Leoni.22 In particular, the latter, highlighting the 
merits of  the customary production of  law in both the Roman and the common 
law traditions, formulated the original and fascinating theory of  “law as individual 
claim”,23 according to which law in its proper and noblest meaning is something 
that arises spontaneously from the free repetition of  certain behaviours by many 
people over time.
In other words, what makes a prerogative, an individual claim, rise to the 
status of  recognised right (and therefore of  law) is the spontaneous recognition of  
the same by the affiliates of  a given community: following this approach, we must 
conclude that the rules governing the digital age should also be derived from the 
customary principles stratified over the centuries, that could be profitably employed 
also in the digital environment.
Indeed, it is by definition to be ruled out the contention that the law should 
follow and adapt rapidly to new scientific and market developments. It is therefore 
an effort that should not be undertaken, because the law in the strictest, noblest 
20 About Italy see e.g. P Burlone and R de Caria, ‘Bitcoin e le altre criptomonete. Inquadramento 
giuridico e fiscale’ (Istituto Bruno Leoni, 1 April 2014, IBL Focus 234) <http://www.brunoleonime-
dia.it/public/Focus/IBL_Focus_234-De_Caria_Burlone.pdf> (accessed 25 October 2019).
21 On which see A Gianturco Gulisano, ‘Bruno Leoni tra positivismo e giusnaturalismo. Il diritto 
evolutivo’ (2009) Foedus 87.
22 For a discussion of  the influence of  the Austrian school of  economics on legal theory, see M 
Litschka and K Grechenig, ‘Law by human intent or evolution? Some remarks on the Austrian 
school of  economics’ role in the development of  law and economics’ (2010) 29(1) European Jour-
nal of  Law and Economics 57.
23 It is the title of  a chapter of  his masterpiece, Freedom and the Law (see the expanded 3rd edn, with 
a foreword by Arthur Kemp (first published 1961, Liberty Fund 1991). The following references 
are taken from this online edn, available at <https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/920> accessed 25 
October 2019).
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and most genuine sense is something that is stratified and consolidated over time: 
it is consequential that, if  the time elapsed is short or very short, by definition law 
cannot have been created, because there has not been enough time for individual 
claims to establish.
To this it is worth adding that it appears a lost battle for lawyers the one 
chasing the latest new technological developments: either the law arrives late, thus 
risking to appear blunt, or, on the contrary, its fervour in trying to keep pace with 
innovation, never letting it happen without previously regulating it, ends up stifling 
that same innovation.24
III. sometHIng new
However, it would be extremely hasty to conclude, from the premises set 
out in the previous paragraph, that there is and cannot be anything new in the law 
with regard to the new disruptive technologies. While it is true that the law should 
not chase innovation, it is certainly also true that something new actually exists, on 
various fronts.
This appears undeniable: wealth is increasingly represented by intangible 
goods: not only have we witnessed the shift of  wealth from real estate to movable 
property, but the movable goods that become increasingly valuable are generally of  
an immaterial nature25. Hence the need to protect the new digital wealth, starting 
from the personal data, and to reflect on their concentration (big data) and the 
modalities of  their treatment and circulation.
From this point of  view, one of  the main topics of  discussion in the world 
of  law is the privacy of  such data: from the way in which it is often addressed, it 
would seem to be an essentially new and unprecedented problem, but as is well 
known, the right to privacy was conceptualised as far back as in 1890,26 only 
12 years after Edison invented his light bulb, just to make an example. And this 
right fundamentally remains the same, in its essential tenets, even though the 
24 The problems arising for regulation when facing fast-developing new technologies was dealt with 
for instance by M Fenwick, WA Kaal, EPM Vermeulen, “Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens 
When Technology Is Faster than the Law” (2017) 6 American University Business Law Review 
561, although with policy conclusions different than my own.
25 See, already several years ago, Margaret M Blair and Steven MH Wallman (eds), Unseen Wealth: 
Report of  the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles (Brookings Institution Press 2001).
26 SD Warren and LD Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4(5) Harvard Law Review 193.
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technological scenario has evolved in a tremendous way from the age of  the Edison 
light bulb.
Arguably, therefore, the regulatory rush, that has put Europe at the vanguard 
in reining in this field, does not appear to be fully justified:27 if  the single piece of  
data is potentially subject to appropriation in the proper sense, then the traditional 
rules on (immaterial) property exist and can be applied; otherwise, it will be without 
protection, similarly to materials that do not have access to copyright protection.
To be sure, what makes the data special is that it is essentially much more 
useful to those who have to acquire it than to those who own it: the data is not only 
or so relevant in itself, but acquires particular relevance because of  its combination 
with a vast amount of  data from other people.28 However, even in this case the 
problem is not new in itself: what the technological society changes from the past, 
if  anything, is the ease with which such data can be found, but since forever, or at 
least since the capitalist mode of  production has consolidated,29 producers have 
had an interest in having as much information as possible about their customers. 
And such an information-gathering effort can arguably be accommodated in the 
existing legal framework without the need for new rules.
However, there are some areas in which we actually see the raise of  new 
issues: in particular, artificial intelligence opens up scenarios that may conflict with 
the traditional notions of  subjectivity, personality, responsibility (one can think of  
neural networks reproducing the functioning of  the human brain, of  machine 
learning, and the internet of  things).30
In these cases, some new questions undoubtedly arise, which were not even 
conceivable a few years ago, and which are therefore worthy of  further investigation. 
New problems certainly call for new answers, but the question becomes where 
27 For a study of  the difficulties in complying with the new General Data Protection Regulation, see 
Sean Sirur, JRC Nurse and H Webb, “Are We There Yet?: Understanding the Challenges Faced in 
Complying with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)” in Proceedings of  the 2nd Interna-
tional Workshop on Multimedia Privacy and Security (ACM 2018) 88; see also the critique to the GDPR 
by TZ Zarsky, “Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of  Big Data” (2017) 47 Seton Hall Law 
Review 995. For a defence of  pre-GDPR EU privacy laws, see C Kuner and others, “Let’s not Kill 
all the Privacy Laws (and Lawyers)” (2011) 1(4) International Data Privacy Law 209.
28 See Shaira Thobani, Diritti della personalità e contratto: dalle fattispecie più tradizionali al trattamento in 
massa dei dati personali (Ledizioni 2018).
29 To use the words of  one of  its paramount critics, Karl Marx.
30 To a certain extent, this was already the contention made by D Friedman, “Does Technology 
Require New Law” (2001) 25 Harvard Journal of  Law & Public Policy 71, 85: “If  what we mean 
by ‘new law’ is ‘new legal rules at the level of  generality of  the rules now used to decide cases’, it is 
clear that new technologies will at least sometimes require new laws”.
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these answers should be found: do they require new law, or is the existing law 
sufficiently well equipped to accommodate these new questions?
In the next paragraph, I will argue why it is appropriate to refer, as often as 
possible, to existing law. Here, I would just like to add a comment about the fact 
that we can usefully distinguish between hard law and soft law when approaching 
this matter.31 In fact, admittedly, what could be beneficial in order to effectively 
deal with the digital age is not a new wave of  hard law, but at most a new set of  
soft law, simply helping to put what is new into context, to define it, and to make 
sense of  it in perspective.
From this point of  view, the white and green papers of  the European 
institutions are something useful, as are the various policy tools available to regulators 
to clarify a matter, without intervening in an intrusive way. Soft law instruments are 
particularly to be welcomed when they anticipate future enforcement practices by 
public authorities, so as to dispel the possible uncertainty.
Also, the perspective of  regulatory sandboxes appears to be a useful road 
to go down: as was effectively explained, “a regulatory sandbox is a framework set 
up by a financial sector regulator to allow small scale, live testing of  innovations 
by private firms in a controlled environment (operating under a special exemption, 
allowance, or other limited, time-bound exception) under the regulator’s supervision. 
The concept, which was developed in a time of  rapid technological innovation in 
financial markets, is an attempt to address the frictions between regulators’ desire 
31 For a general discussion, see GC Shaffer and MA Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Com-
plements, and Antagonists in International Governance” (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 706.
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to encourage and enable innovation and the emphasis on regulation following the 
financial crisis of  2007–2008”.32
This notion has emerged in the world of  fintech, but could be usefully used 
in all areas of  law that have to do with innovation: it would be a new way of  
dealing with novelties, without recourse to pre-emptive hard law.33
IV. sometHIng Borrowed
Ultimately, what the law can usefully do in order to deal with the new 
emerging technologies is to draw on the experiences of  the past, and thus make 
use of  the existing law, handed down to us precisely from the past.
What we should do, in particular, is to borrow the existing law and apply it 
to new cases: when a new technology is created, the preferred operation by both 
policy-makers and interpreters would be to consider the legal categories existing 
in private law, and make use of  those that can be usefully applied to establish a 
framework for it. The tendency that we can observe, for instance in the field of  
DLTs,34 seems rather to be to engage in a contest between different jurisdictions in 
order to be the first one to dictate new rules, often introducing new legal categories, 
in the hope of  triggering a process of  imitation of  their solutions.
But if  the legal comparison and the possible loan or transplant of  rules 
from one system to another can undoubtedly be profitable in practice, in this case 
it would be preferable for the various systems to frame the novelty in their own 
categories. These categories, in fact, reflect at least in part a consolidation of  legal 
‘claims’—to use Leoni’s notion—to which over time the community of  reference 
has recognised legitimacy and protection. It appears a wise choice in terms of  
policy to borrow such claims in order to frame the new ones that arise with the 
emergence of  disruptive technologies.
This approach could face an objection if  we consider, for example, a field 
such as the sharing economy, and in particular the case of  Uber: borrowing the 
rules of  other sectors could lead, for example, to believe that we have to apply the 
32 I Jenik and K Lauer, “Regulatory Sandboxes and Financial Inclusion” CGAP Working Paper, 
October 2017, <https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Working-Paper-Regulatory-Sandbox-
es-Oct-2017.pdf> (accessed 25 October 2019).
33 See various reflections in Financial Conduct Authority, Regulatory sandbox, November 2015, 
<http://www.ifashops.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/regulatory-sandbox.pdf> (accessed 
25 October 2019); DW Arner and others, “FinTech and RegTech in a Nutshell, and the Future 
in a Sandbox” (2017) CFA Institute Research Foundation, 16ff; DA. Zetzsche et al, “Regulating 
a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation” (2017) 23 Fordham Journal of  
Corporate & Financial Law 31.
34 See for instance R Girasa, Regulation of  Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technologies. National and Interna-
tional Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan 2018), especially ch 8, International Regulation, 199ff.
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rules of  labour law to the relationship between this company and its drivers, as is in 
fact invoked by the drivers themselves in different disputes in various jurisdictions.35 
Moreover, quite surprisingly, it was this very company that called, at policy level, 
for the introduction of  new rules, so as to have a clear and defined regulatory 
framework within which to operate,36 as if  the existing law did not already contain 
rules that legitimised its action, if  not at the level of  ordinary legislation, at least at 
the constitutional level.37
Moreover, Uber repeated this strategy also in court, when it insisted on 
arguing that it carried out an activity that could not be framed as public passenger 
transport, which required instead specific treatment by the law (possibly, precisely, 
ad hoc treatment, and in any case new). This strategy has notoriously turned out to 
be a losing one before the Court of  Justice of  the Eu, which has instead found an 
identity between the activity carried out by Uber and the public transport activity 
carried out by existing operators, thus confirming that the existing law is able to 
make room for many of  the innovations that are emerging, without the need for 
legislative interventions ex novo.
It is my contention that a more incisive strategy, even though admittedly 
not necessarily poised for success, would have been one based on acknowledging 
the facts, namely that the Uber directly competes with public transport operators, 
while at the same time claiming that it is (already now) allowed do so on the basis 
of  the unalienable freedom of  economic initiative, as well as of  an immanent 
general principle of  competition, which trumps any contrasting lower-ranking 
legislation.38
Consequently, borrowing the existing legislation appears to be the preferable 
choice, both in terms of  general public policy, and for the disruptive companies 
involved themselves: deferring to the legislator for new legislation means putting 
oneself  in the hands of  the latter, with the risk that it will never decide, and in 
35 For a useful overview, see K Vizjak, “Uber – An Overview of  the International Case Law” in Janja 
Hojnik (ed), Sharing Economy in Europe: Opportunities and Challenges (Zavod 14, 2018) 89ff.
36 See for instance this report by C Zillman, “This Uber Exec Says the Startup ‘Wants to Be Regu-
lated” Fortune (New York, 14 June 2016) <http://fortune.com/2016/06/14/this-uber-exec-says-
the-startup-wants-to-be-regulated/> (accessed 25 October 2019). For a quite opposite reading of  
Uber’s regulatory policies, see R Collier, V Dubal and C Carter, “Disrupting Regulation, Regulat-
ing Disruption: The Politics of  Uber in the United States” (2018) 16(4) Perspectives on Politics 919.
37 I made this point, with regard to the Italian case (but the argument is valid in any other Western 
jurisdiction), in R de Caria, ‘Profili di illegittimità nella disciplina italiana del trasporto pubblico 
non di linea’ (2015) OPAL – Osservatorio per le autonomie locali N. 7.
38 See M Delsignore, Il contingentamento dell’iniziativa economica privata. Il caso non unico delle farmacie aperte 
al pubblico (Giuffrè 2011). 
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any case that opportunities will be created for a very strong lobbying war between 
opposing positions, which inevitably ends up corrupting the law.39
V. sometHIng Blue
In the traditional matrimonial iconography, the blue item is meant to 
represent especially the value of  purity, and fidelity between the bride and the 
groom. In our metaphor, the relationship between law and technology should be 
built in the spirit of  fidelity by technological innovations to established law, that can 
thus preserve its purity.
As argued at the end of  the previous paragraph, the value of  purity of  the 
law cannot give in to any need of  the moment, however urgent it may appear. No 
matter how great the problems raised by the new technologies may appear, we 
must remain faithful to the idea that the law can evolve gradually, without shake-
ups.
As Leoni put it, “Clearly ‘legal’ demands on one hand, and clearly ‘illegal’ 
demands on the other are located at the opposite ends of  a spectrum comprising all 
demands that people may make in any given society at any given time. One should 
not forget, however, the huge intermediate sector of  less definable ‘quasi-legal’ or 
‘quasi-illegal’ demands whose probabilities of  being satisfied are lower than those 
of  clearly ‘legal’ demands, but still higher than those of  clearly ‘illegal’ ones. The 
position of  many, if  not all, demands in the spectrum may change and is actually 
changing in any society at any given time. This process, to use Justinian’s famous 
words, ‘semper in infinitum decurrit’ (is always continuing), and we could not grasp it 
without introducing the time dimension. New demands may appear while old ones 
fade away, and present demands may change their position in the spectrum. The 
whole process may be therefore described as a continuous change of  the respective 
probabilities that all demands have to be satisfied in a given society at any given 
time”.40
Our faith should therefore be placed with the steady, and slow process of  
creation of  the law, rather than with legislation: “This is certainly due, among 
other things, to the conventional faith of  our time in the virtues of  ‘representative’ 
39 In Leoni’s words: “legislation is traced back, more or less implicitly, to the unconditioned will of  a 
sovereign, whoever he may be. The very idea of  legislation encourages the hopes of  all those who 
imagine that legislation, as a result of  the unconditioned will of  some people, will be able to reach 
ends that could never be reached by ordinary procedures adopted by ordinary men; that is, by 
judges and lawyers. The usual phrase by the man in the street today, ‘There ought to be a law’ for 
this or for that, is the naive expression of  that faith in legislation. While the processes conducive 
to lawyers’-law and judge-made-law appear as conditioned ways of  producing law, the legislative 
process appears, or tends to appear, to be unconditioned and a pure matter of  will’ (Leoni (n 23)). 
40 Leoni (n 23).
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democracy, notwithstanding the fact that ‘representation’ appears to be a very 
dubious process even to those experts on politics who would not go so far as to 
say with Schumpeter that representative democracy today is a ‘sham’. This faith 
may prevent one from recognising that the more numerous the people are whom 
one tries to ‘represent’ through the legislative process and the more numerous the 
matters in which one tries to represent them, the less the word ‘representation’ 
has a meaning referable to the actual will of  actual people other than that of  the 
persons named as their ‘representatives’”.41
Policy-wise, this also implies that the regulation of  digital technologies 
should be better left within the field of  private law: the current expansion of  
the public law domain42 is a move to reject, because it arguably leads to the 
interference of  external interests, that are borne by somebody who is not involved 
in a transaction, in the free interplay of  contractual wills by the parties to that 
transaction: “Dean Roscoe Pound pointed out in an essay cited by Professor Hayek 
that contemporary tendencies in the exposition of  public law subordinate the 
interests ‘of  the individual to those of  the public official’ by allowing the latter ‘to 
identify one side of  the controversy with the public interest and so give it a great 
value and ignore the others.’ This applies more or less to all kinds of  administrative 
laws, whether they are administered by independent courts or not”.43
In other words, injecting public law considerations into contractual 
relationships that should remain private is severely in danger of  altering those 
relationships. As Leoni himself  put it by making the example of  marriage, 
particularly in tune with my own metaphor here, “That the legislators, at least in 
the West, still refrain from interfering in such fields of  individual activity as speaking 
or choosing one’s marriage partner or wearing a particular style of  clothing or 
traveling usually conceals the raw fact that they actually do have the power to 
interfere in every one of  these fields”.44 Admittedly, legislators have in fact the 
power to interfere and regulate the situations emerging from the new technological 
41 ibid.
42 See the reflections on this topic by M Ruffert, “Public Law and the Economy: A Comparative 
View from the German Perspective” (2013) 11(4) International Journal of  Constitutional Law 925.
43 Leoni (n 23), citing FA Hayek, The Political Ideal of  the Rule of  Law (Cairo: Fiftieth Anniversary 
Commemoration Lectures, National Bank of  Egypt 1955), 57 (later taken up in The Constitution of  
Liberty).
44 Leoni (n 23).
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advancements, but should arguably refrain from doing so, no less than how they 
normally refrain from interfering in marital relationships.
VI. law and dIsruptIVe teCHnologIes: a Happy marrIage?
Ultimately, on the one hand, it may seem useful for lawyers to invent new 
categories in order to be ahead of  the curve and not to give the feeling of  being left 
behind, but it must always be stressed that the absence of  new rules does not imply 
any regulatory vacuum tout-court,45 and in any case even the regulatory vacuum is 
not in itself  to be rejected.
In all modern legal systems, the “presumption of  liberty”46 should apply, 
according to which all acts not expressly prohibited by the law must be deemed 
lawful. In a rather peculiar move, a few years ago Italy decided to sanction this 
principle (even more oddly, only by way of  ordinary law),47 but this principle, 
even if  implicit, is immanent to all democratic legal systems based on freedom and 
the rule of  law. But if  this is true, to go back to some of  my examples, Uber does 
not—or at least should not—need new pre-emptive rules in order to know how to 
operate, or even to see itself  legitimated to operate; Bitcoin of  blockchain do not 
(or should not) need a normative definition in order to be able to be legitimately 
employed; artificial intelligence does not require a completely new legal paradigm 
and framework in order to be regulated; and so on.
I therefore submit that the law should not run after the latest technological 
advancement, but rather take a step back and effectively apply consolidated 
principles from the past even to today’s fanciest technological gadgets In terms of  
policy, a strong self-restraint by legislators and regulators worldwide is in order: old-
time customary law can arguably be much more effective in regulating the digital 
phenomena, than any hard-law attempt at reigning in an area that is irreconcilable 
with the uncertainties brought about by the tantrums of  written law.
The use of  the so-called new Lex Mercatoria48 and customary law to tackle 
such hot topics as artificial intelligence, or internet of  things, or robotics, might 
appear far-fetched. But what is stratified over time is what is really meant to last, 
overcoming the fashions of  the moment. The most preferable approach seems 
45 In the field of  DLTs, this view was shared for instance by IM Barsan, “Legal Challenges of  Initial 
Coin Offerings (ICO)” (2017) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier 54, 56, although the author 
reaches quite different policy conclusions than the ones advocated for here.
46 On which see, among many, RE Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of  Liberty 
(Princeton University Press 2003).
47 Art 3 of  Decree-law 13 August 2011, No. 138, converted with amendments into law 14 Septem-
ber 2011, No 148
48 For a comprehensive account, see, among many, A Stone Sweet, “The new Lex Mercatoria and 
transnational governance” (2006) 13(5) Journal of  European Public Policy 627.
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therefore to rely on the general “presumption of  liberty”, to admit that any new 
activity, however unusual and disruptive it may be, is lawful, unless it is expressly 
prohibited by an existing rule (but then by definition it will not really be so new), 
and to adopt a wait-and-see approach, possibly with the wide-ranging use, beyond 
the financial field, of  the regulatory sandboxes.49
After all, the fact that certain areas of  the law currently are comparatively 
less relevant than others, in terms of  their economic relevance, does not change 
the nature of  those areas of  the law, let alone of  the law in general itself: movable 
property may have become more valuable than immovable property, but legal 
categories remain the same that have been established over the centuries.
The relationship between technology and law can therefore be a happy 
and lasting marriage, provided that everyone maintains their own personality, and 
the bursting strength of  the new technologies does not force the law to passively 
yield to the needs of  the “partner”: in order to avoid being cannibalised, the law 
must follow its own path, without compromising or losing its nature to chase the 
technology. Then the latter will find in the law strong, consolidated and useful 
categories, not destined to change within a short time-frame: only these can be 
solid bases for their relationship to be lasting and happy.
49 We should indeed never underestimate the adverse effect on innovation – and thus economic cost 
– that a vast application of  the precautionary principle can have, for instance as applied to tort 
law: see G Parchomovsky and A Stein, “Torts and Innovation” (2008) 107 Michigan Law Review 
285.
